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Abst ract  
When personal machines are incorporated into dis- 
tributed systems a new mixture of threats is ex- 
posed. The security effort in the MobyDick project 
is aimed at understanding how privacy can be pro- 
tected in this new environment. Our claim is that 
a two-step rocess for authentication a d authori- 
sation is required, but also sufficient. The research 
vehicle is a distributed file repository. 
1 In t roduct ion  
A personal machine is more than just a small ma- 
chine used by one person at the time. Small, 
portable machines are like traditional personal or- 
ganizers and they contain a wealth of private in- 
formation. If users are to incorporate them into 
a distributed system, they must be confident hat 
the system is trustworthy. But no-one likes to en- 
trust personal information to a third party, e.g., the 
technical staff that happens to maintain the local 
infrastructure. If personal machines are to be truly 
useful for the owner, however, they simply must ex- 
change information with the personal machines of 
others. Therefore, in order to unleash the full po- 
tential of small, personal machines, the infrastruc- 
ture must be constructed with the user in control 
over where his information flows, and who can ac- 
cess it. 
The aim of the MobyDick project 1 is to exploit 
1MobyDick (Esprit Long Term Research 20422) is a 
project of the University of Pisa, Italy, University of Twente, 
Netherlands, and University of Troms¢, Norway. 
the availability of small (mobile), personal ma- 
chines by including them in larger systems. Several 
aspects are investigated, such as replication algo- 
rithms, protocols for variable bandwidth communi- 
cation, and seamless switching between etworking 
technologies. The research vehicle used is a distrib- 
uted file repository (FR). This paper, however, is 
only concerned with the security effort of the Moby- 
Dick project. 
The security effort is targeted at mechanisms 
that enables each user to implement heir own 
polisy for security. Through the services our sys- 
tem provides, we show that in spite of a rather e- 
strictive set of assumptions, the system excels in an 
important area: Allowing users to share data with 
ease and in a secure manner. 
In this paper we present our views on: personal 
computing in the MobyDick project, personal com- 
puting from a security point of view and how per- 
sonal computing changes the r61e of third parties. 
For completeness, we also include a short descrip- 
tion of the research vehicle (FR). 
In Section 2 we give a functional description of 
the services FR provides. The security aspects of 
these services are considered in Section 3. At the 
end we present some related work in Section 4 and 
the current status in Section 5. 
1.1 P r ivate  data  
Assume that an employee has been assigned a 
palm-top computer to replace his paper-based per- 
sonal organiser. He will enter his entire agenda nd 
phone directory, his upcoming appointments and 
other similar information. A phone number will be 
pany as a trusted third party. The credentials the 
company provides--the card with accompanying 
expiration date has no value outside its domain, 
but within it, it is as "good as gold". But, there 
will not always be a trusted path 2 between these 
TTP's,  not even a connected graph. 
1 .2  The  r61e o f  th i rd  par t ies  
Traditionally, computers were used in one domain 
only. For example, a workstation owned and oper- 
ated by a university only needed access to univer- 
sity resources. In this setting, a single trusted third 
party is sufficient. This is the typical setting where 
Kerberos is used to enhance security. 
Kerberos is controlled by the same authority 
that owns and controls the resources. There is an 
implicit link between the policy of authentication 
done by Kerberos (how to obtain a user ID) and 
the policy for authorization. The resources will not 
(have the possibility to) question how the authen- 
tication was done. 
Our system is build on a model which makes it 
significantly different from systems which incorpo- 
rates (by design) a trusted party, that is, trusted 
on the binding between keys and users. It is the 
private data that makes the difference. 
We will argue that authentication authorities 
have different "values" and this must be reflected in 
the system's design. The inclusion of a TTP  (for 
user-key binding) contradicts this. What we re- 
quire is a fine grained mechanism that enables the 
user to anwser "yes, the credidentials are valid, but 
for this particular purpose, they are insuficcient". 
Evaluating authorization credentials this way is an 
everyday excersize in "the real world". Our system 
takes this fact into system design. 
However, there will be one (or more) TTP  for 
practically every Service, with the notable excep- 
tion of user-key binding. For example, still, the 
best way to pay for any merchandise without pass- 
ing physical money is utilizing a credit-card com- 
1.3 The  research  veh ic le  
1 
In MobyDick, a distributed file repository (FR) is 
used as the research vehicle. FR provides ervices 
to users through a set of servers. These cooper- 
ate, and maintain a distributed repository in which 
users can store files. Research into the area of repli- 
cation protocols and policy is part of the project at 
large, but is beyond the scope of this article. 
entered regardless of whether it belongs to a cus- 
tomer or to a family member. This is how this type 
of personalised equipment is generally used. 
Since the machine is personal, it will hold a mix- 
ture of private and work-related ata, and the pri- 
vacy of the owner depends on how this data is 
handled, and by whom. In particular, someone he 
trusts to access/store data in his normal business 
activities, may not be trusted to access his personal 
data. 
Reluctance to placeunlimited trust in others has 
profound effects on the users relationship to the tra- 
ditional trusted third party (TTP~. We will elabo- 
rate on this below. 
Figure 1: Conceptual model 
The owner can grant other users access to his 
files. How this is done, conceptually, is shown in 
Figure 1, where the "O" represents he owner, "U" 
the other user, "FR" the file repository, and ar- 
rows denote messages. Message 1 is a request o 
the owner for an access to one of his files. This 
"message" might very well be "sent" as part of a 
normal conversation. Message 2 is the response, 
containing credentials that the user can use in or- 
der to access the file. Message 3 is a request o 
the FR. This request contains the credentials pro- 
vided in Message 2 plus other credentials that FR 
needs in order to make the required access control 
decision. Message 4 represents the file being sent 
to the user. In our implementation, Message 3 and 
Message 4 are part of a single special-purpose file 
transfer protocol that also transfers credentials. 
• 2At least not in the X.50.q meaning of the word. 
At this conceptual level, we make no assumptions 
about how communication is done. The exchange 
of Messages 1 and 2 does not require a computer 
network. In particular, we have included means 
to convey Message 2 orally. Consequently, creden- 
tials can be "sent" by the owner as part of a con- 
versation, e.g., when speaking in the phone. This 
makes it possible to fulfill a request for access even 
when the owner is disconnected from networking 
infrastructure. 
1 .4  The  cha l lenge  
A system that includes personal machines must 
provide good facilities to protect the privacy of 
users. To provide facilities is quite different from 
providing privacy, and also from enforcing a policy 
that ensures the privacy of users. 
The traditional infrastructure with one single 
TTP  (or a hierarchical structure as in X.509) will 
not be available. And the quality of the authentica- 
tion credentials are evaluated by users, not merely 
whether they are valid or not. The challenge is to 
build an infrastructure under these constraints; this 
is the crux in the security effort in the MobyDick 
project. 
2 Services provided by FR 
In the world of portable computing network connec- 
tivity can not always be relied upon. This makes it 
necessary to facilitate smooth working even when 
disconnected. FR provides services for basic file 
operations, file sharing, off-line delegation of access 
rights and file shipping. 
Basic operat ion:  FR is as a simple file repos- 
itory. Over time, files have many versions. 
In addition, copies of files can be distributed 
over servers; one copy is the master copy. By 
providing storage, and the possibility to store 
state about a file's whereabouts, FR makes it 
possible for the user to decide whether it is 
safe to proceed in any situation where the ex- 
istence of several copies creates a consistency 
problem. The user is kept in the control loop 
and must inform FR about the decisions he 
make. 
Fi le sharing: Every file has an owner. When a 
file is to be shared, the owner must grant the 
borrower access to the file. The credentials 
that give access can grant either read-access, 
write-access, or both. When the file has been 
altered by the borrower, the owner can commit 
the  new version as the official version of the 
file. 
Off-l ine delegat ion:  In FR there is a need to 
transfer a delegation certificate without the 
means of a computer network. That is, in or- 
der to transfer a certificate, the owner may do 
so orally (e.g., the phone). It is highly imprac- 
tical to dictate several hundred hexadecimal 
digits. 
Fi le shipping: Files can be shared by shipping 
them out of the personal domain. 
In order for this service to be available, the 
local FR must cooperate with a FR at some 
other locations. 
3 Security considerations 
When contrasted to sentralized systems, there are 
two important security aspects brought into focus 
by the inclusion of personal machines. The first has 
already been mentioned: third parties that used to 
be trusted for all purposes, might not be trusted 
to perform quite a few number of tasks where the 
users' privacy is at stake. We will elaborate more 
on this below. Second, the user guards resources 
(his files), and access to this resource is granted at 
the discretion of the user, based on two policies: 
the user's policy for authentication and the user's 
policy for authorization. What the policy for au- 
thorization says will (naturally) depend on the re- 
quest, but so will the policy for authentication. For 
example: Any friend can read my phone directory, 
but I am very strict on how I view the credentials 
of a friend. At the other extreme, any colleague can 
read the report I am writing, and the departemen- 
tal Kerberos server is trusted to identy collegues. 
If it so happens that one of my collegues also'is a 
friend, authorization by means of Kerberos is suf- 
ficient for obtaining my report, but insufficient for 
obtaining my directory. The point of interest is that 
the user would like to base the decision on which 
credentials to accept at the time of their presenta- 
tion. 
3 .1  P r inc ipa ls  
Principals have one or more encryption keys as- 
sociated with them. These keys can be viewed as 
proxies on which statements from the principal will 
appear. It is then, ultimately, left to the user to 
make a binding between the information the sys- 
tem can provide about the encryption key that has 
been used and the human the user wants to relate 
to. The problem users have to consider is whether 
the "correct" principal controls the channel in ques- 
tion, and who is responsible for statements appear- 
ing on a particular channel. 
The main reason for placing the user in focus 
is the great many number of "informal" channels 
that arises when personal machines are involved. 
It is impossible to keep track of such information 
in order to use it in some formal method of autho- 
rization. By focusing on what users "say", often 
through a variety of channels, we try to make it pos- 
sible for users to interact with other users through 
the FR. 
3 .2  T rus ted  comput ing  base  
In FR the only principal a user must trust is him- 
self. When a user places trust in his own secrets, 
he implicitly also trusts his own ability to safeguard 
them. The reason is that placing trust in a secret 
is, of course, a meaningless statement by itself. 
Even though FR is the system component that 
we have constructed, it is not at all assumed that 
it is part of the user's TCB. However, in order to 
use the FR, the user must trust it to perform its 
tasks according to specification. FR is only used 
to store files, and it is only trusted to not disclose 
the contents of these files; see below for a detailed 
description of the assumptions a user must make. 
Notice that a user only has to trust his local FR 
server; when exploiting other servers these must be 
trusted explicitly. 
3 .3  Key  d is t r ibut ion  
In general we can not assume that communica- 
tion with a third party is possible for users of FR; 
at least not without incurring high costs, particu- 
larly in time. The widespread use of modems and 
other point-to-point technologies make this appar- 
ent. Therefore, precautions must be taken to en- 
sure that the user either has the available the keys 
he will need, or has the possibility to infer trust in 
keys presented to him during the session. 
In other words, the arguments against relying on 
a third party in general is a practical one. This 
contrasts to our dismissal of trusted third parties. 
Notice that when the user has sufficient connec- 
tivity, key-distribution can be performed by a va- 
riety of protocols, see [5] for examples. In the case 
of sufficient communication bandwidth, verification 
of certificates can also be done, for example by an 
on-line agent, as described in [4, section 5.1]. 
Without a TTP  for user authentication, trust 
in keys is no longer binary (complete trust or no 
trust). Therefore, each user must build up trust 
in the keys he assembles, and assemble keys he be- 
lieves belong to users he trusts. 
In centralized systems there is a certification au- 
thority (CA) that will issue certificates on the bind- 
ing between users and keys. Trusting such a CA 
makes protocols for key distribution less hard. On 
the other hand, the CA may impersonate the user. 
This might be tolerable in a centralized system 
where those controlling the CA also control (and 
own) the resources. It is definitely not acceptable 
in a world of personal computing. 
In the implementation of FR we use a widely 
accepted format for storing and exchanging public 
keys and certificates, namely PGP [8]. We have 
written software to interface FR to existing PGP 
key rings, key servers, and certificates used in FR 
are expressed in a format compatible with PGp. 
3 .4  T rus t ing  the  F i le  Repos i to ry  
The FR is truSted to enforce that only the owner 
of files, or those users the owner delegates some of 
his authority, will have access to them. 
Since trust is placed in the willingness and ability 
of those in charge of the FR, it is impossible to 
enumerate what this really implies. However, by 
limiting ourself to trust the FR as described above, 
the danger becomes l s hard to live with. 
In less general terms, the trust amounts to (at 
least) the following: 
• When a certificate states that the holder of 
some key might have access to a particular file, 
the FR will ensure that the requester indeed 
have access to the key. 
• FR will destroy temporary keys (e.g., session 
keys that provide encryption channels) after 
they have been used. 
• When presented with a once-only certificate 
(see below) the FR will hold a copy of the cer- 
tificate until it expires (to ensure at-most-once 
semantics), or, if this is impossible for some 
reason, reject it. 
• Ensuring that if files are taken off-line (backup, 
for example) they will be protected at least 
as good as the versions stored on-line (see 
e.g., [2]). 
Users of centralized systems will be well acquainted 
with these assumptions, as they apply. However, in 
contrast o such systems, the following is also the 
case: 
• The FR is not part of the user TCB. 
3.5 File sharing 
Files are protected by FR, and sharing a file with 
some other user U requires the owner O to delegate 
some of his authority to U. This is done by issuing 
a delegation certificate. When O delegates access 
to a file, he trustsU, in the case of a read certificate, 
to protect the content of the file, and, in the case 
of a write certificate, not to let any third user write 
to the file. 
The important parts of certificates for delegating 
access to a file are: 
• The name of the server on which the file can 
be accessed; 
This is important since files in FR might be 
replicated. To ensure the once-only semantics 
of a certificate it should be valid at one server 
only. 
• To which channel the file can be given; 
Usually, certificates are issued to a public key, 
that is, the holder of the secret part of the key- 
pair will be able to present the credentials on 
the correct encryption channel. The "name" of 
the key can be expressed in any form suitable 
for indexing at the server. However, when U 
wants to remain anonymous, O can generate 
a new key-pair and include the public part in 
the certificate and hand the secret part over 
to U. FR will honour a request arriving on the 
channel that the key represents. When dele- 
gation is performed to an anonymous key, no 
trace will remain in the system of the identity 
of U, neither at FR nor by O. 
When FR has fulfilled the request, it will hold on 
to the certificate until it expires. This way FR can 
enforce the once-only semantics. 
O may keep a copy of the certificate and use it for 
revocation purposes. FR keeps a copy of a revoke 
order for as long as the certificate is valid. 
3 .6  F i le  shipping 
When a user travels to a remote site, he can utilize 
the distributed aspects of FR and ship some of his 
files there. In order to use this feature, the user 
must trust the remote FR to protect his files as 
good as the local FR does. The problem, of course, 
is that the user can not be expected to know first 
hand those in charge of a remote FR, and this gives 
rise to the question of how to exchange keys. Unless 
the user has some other means to obtain the key, 
the local FR must supply a certificate stating that 
some key belongs to the remote FR. The indirect 
nature of the certificate reflects the problem of us- 
ing an unknown service. Likewise, since the remote 
FR does not have any knowledge of the "physical" 
user and can only relate to a certificate from the 
local FR (local to the user, that is) that ties the 
user's key to a statement about the users status as 
user of the local FR. 
3.7 Off-line Delegation 
Off-line delegation is a means to convey certificates 
orally. In order for this service to be available to the 
user, a secret must be shared with FR. This secret 
is used to create a secret channel between the two. 
However, when such a channel is created, the FR 
can construct certificates and claim they originate 
from the user. There are a great many security 
problems related to channels based on shared se- 
crets. Consequently, off-line delegation service is 
an exercise in the tradeoff between ease of use and 
security. 
4 Re la ted  work  
[4] 
The view on principals expressed in this paper is [5] 
similar to the one presented in [6]. The once-only 
semantics FR enforces on delegation certificates i
related to, but different, from the one found in [3], [6] 
and is historically related to capabilities [7]. Re- 
lated to PolicyMaker [1], our system is essentially 
performing similar functionality, but we have em- 
bedded it in an application and not as a general 
solution. Well established solutions uch as Ker- [7] 
beros provide valuable impulses, although they are 
designed for centralized environments. 
5 Cur rent  s ta tus  
An implementation f FR is in use and available. 
The security architecture described in this paper is 
currently under implementation, incorporated into 
FR. 
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